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Supplemental Analysis
Abstract
This document contains some supplemental material for the note “Restrictions in Spatial
Competition: The Effects on Firms and Consumers.” We introduce and discuss a particular
model to substantiate the assertion made in the note that the novel cases can also emerge
when restrictions are endogenously, not exogenously, determined. In the note we refer to
this material in Section 4 in footnote 11.
A Model with Endogenous Choice of Restrictions
We consider here a simple variant of the standard market entry game. PositionsX and consumers
are as specified in the note. There are now two periods t = 0, 1. In period 0 a firm F1 is a
monopolist in the market. In period t = 1 either F1 stays monopolist or a second firm F2
enters. The sequence of actions is as follows. (i) F1 chooses a set of feasible strategies S1 and
some initial position s10 ∈ S1. (ii) F2 chooses whether to enter the market and if it enters it
chooses some position s2 ∈ X.1 (iii) F1 chooses a position s1 ∈ S1 to compete against F2. In
a monopoly situation F1 serves all consumers, in a duopoly with s1 6= s2 consumers are split
as in the static model. If s1 = s2, we assume that all consumers stay at the incumbent and do
not switch to the entrant.2 One interpretation for this assumption is that consumers face small
switching costs which cause inertia. Let pi : [0, 1] → R+ be a continuously increasing function
that assigns a profit to any mass of consumers. Moreover, let 0 < fentry < pi(12) be the fixed
costs of market entry. For F1, let C : [0, 1]→ R+ be an increasing function that represents the
costs of flexibility. We assume that the larger the range [s1, s¯1], the higher these costs. Moreover,
let δ ∈ (0, 1] be F1’s discount factor. The payoffs of F1 and F2 are then
Π1,Π2 =

pi(1)− C(s¯1 − s1) + δpi(1− F (xˆ)), pi(F (xˆ))− fentry, if s2 < s1
pi(1)− C(s¯1 − s1) + δpi(F (xˆ)), pi(1− F (xˆ))− fentry, if s2 > s1
pi(1)− C(s¯1 − s1) + δpi(1), pi(0)− fentry, if s2 = s1
pi(1)− C(s¯1 − s1) + δpi(1), pi(0), if no-entry.
We now derive a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) by backward induction. Because
of the open set issue this will be a “perfect epsilon-equilibrium” (Radner, 1980).
(iii) If F2 does not enter, then the choice s1 ∈ S1 is arbitrary. If F2 enters and s2 ∈ S1, then s1 = s2 is
profit maximizing (because then F1 receives all consumers). If F2 enters and s2 /∈ S1, then s1 = s1
when s2 < s1 and s1 = s¯1 when s2 > s¯1 is profit maximizing for F1.
1After observing F1’s first move, there would be no incentive to build a strategy set that consists of more than
one position.
2The result for the convention that the two firms split the market equally will be trivially that both firms
choose the median. This observation stays true in the model variation, where firms first simultaneously choose
feasible strategies and then simultaneously choose positions within their feasible set.
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(ii) Given optimal behavior of F1 in decision (iii), we receive the following payoffs for different decisions
of F2 at stage (ii):
Π2 =

pi(0)− fentry, if s2 ∈ S1
pi(F (s1 − ε2 ))− fentry, if s2 = s1 − ε
pi(1− F (s¯1 + ε2 ))− fentry, if s2 = s¯1 + ε
pi(0), if F2 does not enter
for ε > 0. Choosing s2 ∈ S1 is strictly dominated by not entering. In the two central cases, the
payoff of F2 is decreasing in ε. Thus, we have an open set problem as in Case (IIb) of the short-term
analysis. The supremum here is F (s1) respectively 1− F (s¯1) and it can be approached by letting
ε shrink. Therefore F2 enters if
pi(max{F (s1), 1− F (s¯1)}) > fentry (1)
and chooses a sufficiently small ε. Otherwise, i.e. if Condition (1) does not hold, F2 does not enter.
(i) To derive the optimal behavior of F1 in stage (i), we distinguish between the best entry deterring
and the best entry admitting choice. Anticipating the behavior in stage (ii) and (iii) a strategy set
S1 is entry deterring if pi(F (s1)) ≤ fentry and pi(1− F (s¯1)) ≤ fentry. Let y := F−1(pi−1(fentry)),
i.e. the rightmost position that still does not allow for profitable entry to the left and, similarly,
y¯ := F−1(1 − pi−1(fentry)).3 Then the best entry deterring choice is S1 = [y, y¯]. Note that y is
increasing in fentry, i.e. the larger the entry costs, the smaller the necessary flexibility to deter
entry.
The best choice of S1 given that F2 enters is the solution to the following maximization problem:
max
s1,s¯1
pi(1)− C(s¯1 − s1) + δpi(1−max{F (s1), 1− F (s¯1)}). (2)
Since any choice such that F (s1) 6= 1−F (s¯1) is a “waste” of flexibility costs, we have in equilibrium
F (s1) = 1 − F (s¯1). Thus, we can substitute s1 = F−1(1 − F (s¯1)) to rewrite the maximization
problem in dependence of one variable only:
max
s¯1∈[q,y¯]
pi(1)− C(s¯1 − F−1(1− F (s¯1))) + δpi(F (s¯1)) (3)
A choice s¯1 > y¯ is excluded by assumption because it deters entry and the last profit is the
simplification of pi(1− (1− F (s¯1)).
This maximization problem (3) incorporates the trade-off between leaving few consumers for a
potential entrant (large s¯1) and saving flexibility costs (small s¯1). The solution to this problem
depends on the specifications of the cost function C, of the entry costs fentry, of the payoff function
pi, and of the distribution of consumers F , but it certainly exists because we maximize a continuous
function over a compact set. Let z¯ be a solution to this problem (3), be it an interior solution
(z¯ ∈ (q, y¯)) or a boundary solution (z¯ = q or z¯ = y¯). Let z := F−1(1 − F (z¯)). Then F1’s profit
maximizing behavior under entry and no-entry of F2 leads to the following payoffs:
Π1 =
pi(1)− C(y¯ − y) + δpi(1), if S1 = [y, y¯]pi(1)− C(z¯ − z) + δpi(F (z¯)), if S1 = [z, z¯]
3F and pi are strictly increasing continuous functions such that they can be inverted.
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The specific functional forms determine which choice leads to higher payoff and, hence, F1’s choice
in stage (i). Inspecting the two equilibrium payoffs above reveals that entry deterrence becomes
relatively more attractive for lower costs of flexibility, for higher costs of entry, and for a larger
discount factor. In Example 1 we illustrate how these model parameters determine the equilibrium
path.
From the backward induction exercise we learn first of all that there always exists a sub-
game perfect epsilon-equilibrium. Moreover, there are two types of these equilibria, one entry
admitting one entry deterring, which both satisfy the following two properties.
(a) q ∈ S1 ⊆ [y, y¯], i.e. F1 chooses a feasible set at the center of the market within certain
boundaries and
(b) F (s1) = 1− F (s¯1), i.e. the ‘niches’ left for F2 at both sides of the center are of equal size.
In the entry deterring equilibrium, (i) F1 chooses S1 = [y, y¯], (ii) F2 does not enter, and (iii)
F1’s final position s1 is arbitrary within S1 because it acts as monopolist. An entry deterrent
F1 gains pi(1)−C(y¯− y) + δpi(1). Thus, it has the cost of flexibility C(y¯− y) to keep a threat to
potential entrants. This is similar to a threat of a price war, but this threat is credible because
after investments into flexibility have been made, a ‘minimal differentiation war’ is costless in our
model. Welfare depends on the exact location of s1 ∈ S1 since the closer s1 to the median, the
smaller the total transportation costs. Thus, the size of the feasible set S1 not only determines
the cost of flexibility, but also provides an upper bound for the transportation costs. Since the
size of F1’s restriction is increasing in F2’s costs of entry fentry, entry barriers might even be
considered as welfare enhancing.4 Similarly, low marginal costs of flexibility increase the set of
feasible positions S1 and thus relax the upper bound of transportation costs. By property (a)
this boundary for total transportation costs also applies to the entry admitting equilibrium.
The entry admitting equilibrium path is as follows: (i) F1 chooses S1 = [z, z¯] such that z
solves (3), i.e. it optimizes the trade-off between low costs of flexibility and a large market share;
(ii) F2 enters and chooses an adjacent position to F1’s restriction, i.e. s2 = s1 − ε, respectively
s2 = s¯1 + ε; and (iii) F1 reacts with choosing its restriction adjacent to s2, i.e. s1 = z or s1 = z¯.
Observe that the outcome of this dynamic model corresponds to Case (IIb) of the static analysis,
where F1 is in the role of the more-central player. We discussed in Subsection 3.4 of the note
that this is the case with potentially high inequality and low welfare. In given examples, the
specific inequality and the total transportation costs are determined by the size of the interval
S1 such that we get the following comparative static effects. Both equality of firms’ payoffs and
welfare are increasing in F1’s marginal costs of flexibility (called c in Example 1 below) and in
F1’s discount factor δ. In the worst situation, F1 values the second period highly (δ = 1), while
flexibility is relatively cheap. Then it chooses a large feasible set S1 with only small niches left
for F2 such that market shares are highly unequal, while consumers’ transportation costs are
large because two similar products away from the center of the market are offered. Of course,
this can only be an entry admitting equilibrium if F2’s costs of entry fentry are sufficiently low.
4The intuition is that low costs of entry lead to costly investments into flexibility that allow the incumbent to
offer products which are not close to the center of the market.
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To study how costs of market entry and other model parameters determine which equilibrium
is played and to illustrate further comparative static effects, we use a specific example for which
an explicit solution can be easily obtained.
Example 1. Consider the special case of uniform distribution of consumers, i.e. F (x) = x,
quadratic costs of flexibility, i.e. C(r) = cr2 with cost parameter c, and linear payoff function,
i.e. pi(a) = a. From (1) we get that F2 enters if max{s1, 1 − s¯1} > fentry. Moreover, let
fentry < 38 , which in this case (pi is the identity function) can be interpreted as the market share
that is necessary to make market entry profitable. F1 can optimally deter entry by choosing
s1 = y = fentry and s¯1 = y¯ = 1 − fentry. The optimal choice of F1 given that F2 enters is the
solution to the maximization problem (cf. (2)), which simplifies to
max
s¯1∈[ 1
2
,1−fentry ]
1− c(2s¯1 − 1)2 + δs¯1. (4)
Analogous to Eq. (3), the main idea of the simplification is that best actions satisfy here s1 =
1 − s¯1. If fentry > 12 − δ8c , then we have the boundary solution z¯ = y¯ = 1 − fentry and
z = y = fentry. In that case entry admission is never profitable and we have the entry deterring
equilibrium. On the other hand, if fentry ≤ δ8c , then the unique solution to this maximization
problem is z¯ = 12 +
δ
8k . In that case we have to compare the payoff of F1 under the optimal
entry admitting choice S1 = [12 − δ8k , 12 + δ8k ] with the payoff of the optimal choice that deters
entry S1 = [fentry, 1−fentry]. Low enough entry costs fentry, high marginal costs of flexibility c,
as well as low enough valuation of the future δ, make the entry admitting choice of restrictions
more profitable than entry deterrence.
For instance, for c = 1 and δ = 0.8, F1 prefers to admit entry of F2 if fentry < 15 , i.e. if the
required market share to make entry profitable is below 20%. In that case we get the following
equilibrium path: (i) F1 chooses S1 = [0.4, 0.6] and s0 ∈ S1 arbitrary, e.g. s0 = 0.5 = q.
F2 enters with strategy s2 = 0.4 − ε (or with s2 = 0.6 + ε) for some small ε > 0. F1 reacts
with s1 = 0.4 (respectively, s1 = 0.6). The market share of F1 is approximately 60%, while F2
receives approximately 40%. The outcome is inefficient for two reasons. First costly investments
into flexibility are not justified by some welfare benefit. Second, F1 locates at the position within
S1 that actually maximizes total transportation costs.
There is an alternative interpretation for the model set-up of this section. Consider the
incumbent’s investment into flexibility as investment into patents that protect its initial product
s10. Specifically, the choice S
1 = [s1, s¯1] can be interpreted as restricting the feasible strategies
of a potential entrant, i.e. F2’s strategy set is restricted to X \ S1 = [0, s1) ∪ (s¯1, 1]. The model
results in an entry deterring or an entry admitting equilibrium as described above.
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